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United S tates Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 1, 2011 Decided December 9, 2011
No. 09-7032
Carolyn Singh,
Appellant
v.
George Washington University 
School of Medicine and Health Sciences, et al., 
Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia 
(No. 1:03-cv-01681)
Kate Bushman, Supervising Attorney, argued the cause as 
amicus curiae in support of appellant. With her on the briefs 
were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, and 
Elizabeth A. Spavins and Stephanie B. Lezell, Student 
Counsel.
Carolyn Singh, pro se, filed briefs for appellant.
Henry Morris Jr. argued the cause for appellees. With 
him on the brief was Kristine J. Dunne.
Robert A. Burgoyne and Ada Meloy were on the brief for 
amici curiae American Council on Education, et al.
2Before: Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges, and 
Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Rogers.
Rogers, Circuit Judge: This appeal is before the court 
following a remand. In the first appeal the court established 
the legal standards the district court must apply in 
determining whether Carolyn singh, a former medical 
student, had an impairment that substantially limited her in 
the major life activity of learning under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 
Specifically, the court rejected both the district court’s use of 
a comparison group of other medical students, holding that 
the correct comparator was the average person, and its focus 
on test-taking, holding that the major life activity at issue was 
Singh’s ability to learn. Singh v. Geo. Wash. Univ. Sch. o f 
Med. & Health Scis. (“2007 Singh Appeal”), 508 F.3d 1097, 
1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Having failed to prevail again, 
singh, assisted by amicus, contends that on remand the 
district court erred by failing to apply the 2008 amendments 
to the ADA and in relying on her prior academic achievement 
in assessing whether she suffered from a disability under the 
ADA. Because Singh fails to show legal or clear factual error 
by the district court, see Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 123 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), we affirm.
I.
During Singh’s time as a medical student at George 
Washington University, her poor grades placed her continued 
enrollment at risk on four occasions. She had been admitted 
to the University’s Decelerated Program for students with 
weaker academic records, in view of her poor performance on 
the standardized medical-school entrance exam (“MCAT”).
3Students in the Decelerated Program have two years to 
complete the curriculum that regular-matriculation students 
finish in their first year. The University requires Decelerated- 
Program students to maintain adequate academic performance 
and publishes academic regulations that set out a procedure 
for dismissal in the event of poor performance.
Despite Singh’s overall academic success in high school 
and college, she quickly encountered difficulty in medical 
school. Beginning in her first semester in Fall 2000 and 
continuing throughout her six semesters at the University, 
Singh received failing grades in multiple courses and failed to 
satisfy the University’s standard-deviation requirement in 
others. Nevertheless, Singh maintained an active 
extracurricular schedule throughout this period, including 
serving as the social chair of the University’s student council, 
participating in multiple medical associations as the student 
representative, and enrolling in a music course. Singh’s 
pattern of poor academic performance was evaluated by the 
Medical Student Evaluation Committee (“MSEC”) on three 
occasions. On the first two occasions, she was advised to re­
take certain courses, to reduce or eliminate her extracurricular 
activities, to improve her study habits, and generally to 
concentrate on her medical studies. In the last review, when 
her grades did not improve, the MSEC recommended to the 
Dean of the medical school that she be dismissed. Singh was 
“quite distressed” by this turn of events, Trial Tr. Nov. 22, 
2005, at 150, and sought advice from the University’s 
Disability Support Services, which referred her to Dr. Anne 
Newman for psycho-educational testing. After interviewing 
Singh about her background and administering diagnostic 
tests, Dr. Newman concluded that Singh had a reading 
disorder -  dyslexia -  as well as a mild processing-speed 
disorder. Report of Anne C. Newman, Ph.D., on Feb. 19, 
2003 interpretative session (“Newman Report”), at 7. Dr.
4Newman recommended a number of academic 
accommodations, psychotherapy, investigation of the 
appropriateness of psychostimulant medication, and a 
reduction in volunteer activities.
Meanwhile, the Dean of the medical school had received 
the MSEC’s dismissal recommendation and he concurred. On 
February 11, 2003, the Dean met with Singh and her mother 
to notify Singh of the MSEC’s recommendation and his 
decision to dismiss her. Singh informed the Dean of Dr. 
Newman’s pending report, which she forwarded to the Dean 
two weeks later. On March 5, 2003, the Dean officially 
notified Singh by letter of her dismissal from the University; 
the Dean later testified that Dr. Newman’s report “played no 
role” in his decision to dismiss Singh. Trial Tr. Nov. 23, 
2005, at 403-04.
In 2003, Singh filed a complaint alleging that the 
University had unlawfully discriminated against her in 
violation of the ADA. The district court granted summary 
judgment in part for Singh, finding that “[a] reasonable fact 
finder could only conclude that plaintiff suffers from some 
kind of mental impairment,” but denied summary judgment as 
to whether her learning was substantially limited. Singh v. 
Geo. Wash. Univ., 368 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2005). 
After a bench trial, the district court found that Singh did not 
have a disability as defined under the ADA and entered 
judgment for the University. Singh v. Geo. Wash. Univ. Sch. 
o f Med. & Health Scis., 439 F. Supp. 2d 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2006). 
Finding that Singh had failed to show that her impairment had 
caused a substantial limitation on learning, the district court 
stated that, “[t]o the contrary, [Singh] appear[ed] quite able to 
succeed in the major life activity of learning, including test­
taking in general.” Id. at 14.
5On appeal, this court held that the proper comparison 
group for the substantial-limitation determination was the 
general population, not other people of comparable age and 
educational background as the district court had ruled, and 
that the relevant major life activity was learning, not test­
taking. 2007 Singh Appeal, 508 F.3d at 1100, 1104. The 
court remanded the case, stating that the district court had 
“fail[ed] to state important factual findings specially,” 
“intermix[ed] . . . the legal standards of impairment with those 
of substantial limitation,” and mischaracterized the testimony 
of Dr. Rick Ostrander, the University’s expert witness. Id. at 
1106-07.
On remand, the district court revised and clarified its 
analysis but reached the same result as it had in 2005. Singh 
v. Geo. Wash. Univ. Sch. o f Med. & Health Scis. (“2009 
Remand Opinion”), 597 F. Supp. 2d 89, 90 (D.D.C. 2009). In 
applying the comparison-group and major-life-activity 
standards established by this court and in concluding that 
Singh had failed to demonstrate a disability under the ADA, 
the district court concluded that it did not need to decide 
whether the alleged limitation was “substantial” because 
Singh “ha[d] not shown that her limitation [was] a result of 
her impairment.” Id. at 96. The district court found that 
Singh’s expert, Dr. Newman, had failed “to establish the 
requisite causal link,” and that Singh’s “spotty, anecdotal 
corroborative evidence [did] not suffice” to bolster that 
causation evidence. Id. at 97. Singh appeals.
II.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled 
individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). An individual seeking to 
establish a disability must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, see Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 861
6(D.C. Cir. 1999), that (1) she suffers from a physical or 
mental impairment; (2) the impairment relates to a “major life 
activity,” and (3) the impairment “substantially limits” her in 
one or more “major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see 
Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As 
established in the prior proceedings, the impairment at issue is 
Singh’s learning disorder, and the corresponding major life 
activity is learning.
A.
Effective January 1, 2009, Congress amended the ADA. 
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAA”), Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Congress rejected the 
Supreme Court’s prior holding that the ADA set forth a 
“demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” Toyota 
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), 
as well as the holding in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 475 (1999), that courts should account for 
mitigating measures when making disability determinations. 
ADAA, § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554. The ADAA provides that the 
“determination of whether an impairment substantially limits 
a major life activity shall be made without regard to the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as . . . 
learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.” 
Id. § 4, 122 Stat. at 3556.
Singh contends that the district court erred in failing to 
apply the ADAA, which was the law in effect at the time of 
its decision on remand. The University objects to our 
consideration of this contention on two grounds: forfeiture 
and retroactivity. We need not address forfeiture because the 
second objection is well taken.
Courts disfavor retroactive application of laws absent 
clear expression of congressional intent to do so. See
7Landgraf v. USIFilm Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264, 272 (1994). 
This anti-retroactivity principle is grounded in the notions of 
fair notice and reasonable reliance. See id. at 265. In 
determining whether a statute can operate retroactively, the 
court asks “whether the new provision attaches new legal 
consequences to events completed before its enactment,” id. 
at 270, a question that may turn on the nature of the relief 
sought by the plaintiff. “When the intervening statute
authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, 
application of the new provision is not retroactive.” Id. at 
273. Damages constitute retrospective relief and thus raise 
retroactivity concerns. See id. at 281-84. The statute in 
Landgraf posed retroactivity problems because it expanded 
the types of relief available to plaintiffs. See id. at 253-54. 
Although the Supreme Court recognized that the new 
compensatory-damages provision “only reach[ed] 
discriminatory conduct already prohibited by Title VII,” and 
thus the defendant was already on notice that the relevant 
conduct was unlawful, the new provision “affect[ed] the 
liabilities of defendants,” impacted the “private parties’ 
planning,” and “attach[ed] an important new legal burden to 
that conduct.” Id. at 282-83. As such, retroactive application 
was not appropriate. Id. at 284. As a cautionary note, the 
Court instructed that although “[i]t will frequently be true . . . 
that retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate 
its purpose more fully,” that “consideration . . . is not 
sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactivity.” Id. 
at 285-86.
This court held in Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Authority, 
572 F.3d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that Congress did not 
intend the ADAA to operate retroactively, pointing in 
particular to Congress’ decision to set an effective date in the 
future. See also Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 332 F. App’x 882, 
883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Argo Distrib., LLC, 555
8F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009); Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar 
Inc., 295 F. App’x 850, 851 (7th Cir. 2008). In Lytes, the 
plaintiff had sought retrospective relief, including damages 
and back pay. 572 F.3d at 939. Singh emphasizes that she 
does not seek monetary damages, see Singh, 368 F. Supp. 2d 
at 72, and that the injunctive relief she seeks would operate in 
the future and is thus prospective. To gain that relief, 
however, Singh must first be reinstated, overturning the 
University’s decision in 2003 to dismiss her; her complaint 
seeks a declaratory judgment that she “is a student in good 
standing” at the University. Compl. at 12. Much as with a 
request for damages, reinstatement is backward-looking and 
seeks to remedy a past unlawful act. See Lytes, 572 F.3d at 
939, 945; Dave v. Lanier, 681 F. Supp. 2d 68, 72 n.3 (D.D.C. 
2010). Applying the ADAA to the University’s decision in 
2003 to dismiss Singh would be changing the laws that 
governed the University’s liability at that time, imposing a 
new legal burden on the University’s past conduct. As such, 
its application would be impermissibly retroactive.
B.
Singh also contends that the district court clearly erred on 
remand in finding that her impairment did not substantially 
limit her ability to learn. Specifically she takes issue with the 
district court’s consideration of her past academic 
achievement as compelling the conclusion that she failed to 
show causation. She emphasizes that the ADA requires proof 
of a present, not past, substantial limitation.
The district court’s decision on remand rested on the 
factual findings that: (1) Singh had an impairment; (2) Singh 
presented evidence of a limitation on her learning ability; (3) 
numerous potential causes existed to explain that limitation; 
and (4) Singh failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that her impairment, and not the other factors,
9caused that limitation. Based on these findings, the district 
court concluded that Singh had failed to prove causation, one 
of the three elements necessary to show the presence of a 
disability under the ADA. See 2009 Remand Opinion, 597 F. 
Supp. 2d at 96-97. We need not decide whether Singh had an 
impairment within the meaning of the ADA, or whether that 
alleged impairment substantially limited a major life activity. 
The district court’s factual finding on causation, see Daniels 
v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 566 F.2d 749, 756 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), is not clearly erroneous and that finding alone dooms 
her case. The district court identified “many reasons aside 
from [Singh’s] impairment that might explain why [she] has 
done relatively poorly on extremely time-limited tests.” 2009 
Remand Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 96. For example, the 
district court listed anxiety from the difficulty of the medical 
school academic environment, “her involvement in extra­
curricular activities,” which a number of University advisors 
had suggested she curtail or eliminate in view of her academic 
difficulties, and poor study habits as possible causes of her 
poor performance. Id. Although the district court prefaced 
each of these potential causes with the word “perhaps,” id., it 
referenced record evidence for each of the possible causes, 
including that Singh was overextended in extracurriculars, id. 
at 96 n.7, and had poor study habits, such as her admission 
that she sang along to music while studying, id. at 96 n.8. The 
district court also identified record evidence of yet other 
possible causes for Singh’s poor performance, such as Singh’s 
own testimony that attributed her academic problems “at least 
in some degree to . . . being upset over the September 11th [, 
2001 terrorist] attacks.” Trial Tr. Nov. 21, 2005, at 93-94 
(cited by 2009 Remand Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 97 n.10).
The district court did not ignore Singh’s claim “that she 
consistently perform[ed] much lower on multiple-choice tests 
than on other types of assessments,” 2009 Remand Opinion,
10
597 F. Supp. 2d at 97, or the corroborative evidence Singh 
presented, but found it to be “spotty” and “anecdotal” and 
insufficient to establish the necessary causal link. Id. 
Specifically, the district court found that the evidence of her 
past difficulties with multiple-choice testing failed to close the 
causal gap between her mental impairment and her limitation 
in learning, as distinct from test-taking alone. This conclusion 
holds true regardless of whether Singh was at the top or 
bottom of her high school class or aced or bombed her 
MCAT, because that past academic performance had no 
bearing on causal factors such as Singh’s extracurricular 
involvements and poor study habits. Given the totality of the 
evidence, the district court did not clearly err in concluding 
that Singh had failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that 
her impairment caused her limitation on learning.
To establish a disability under the ADA, a plaintiff must 
establish not only that she suffers from an impairment but also 
that the impairment causes a significant limitation on a major 
life activity. Singh presented evidence that she suffered from 
a mental impairment and experienced a limitation on learning 
that was evident while she was in medical school; whether or 
not she did, multiple factors existed to explain the cause of 
that limitation. Accordingly, because the district court did not 
clearly err in finding that Singh failed to establish that her 
asserted impairment caused her asserted learning limitation, 
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
